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STAINED GLASS CEILING
ABSTRACT
An examination of the protections afforded to religious institutions
in their hiring decisions. Both § 702 of the Civil Rights Act and the
judicially created ministerial exception allow churches to use criteria
that other employers are not permitted to use under the law when
making hiring decisions. Beginning with McClure v. Salvation Army,
courts have slowly expanded the scope of these protections, leading
up to the recent case of Petruska v. Gannon University. Petruska
provides an example of the extent to which a broad reading of § 702
and the ministerial exception can harm religious workers. The
opinion of Judge Becker, who wrote the first appeals court decision,
presented an alternative view of § 702 and the ministerial exception,
as he believed that the courts have a duty to protect the rights of
religious workers and that the protections of § 702 and the ministerial
exception should only be imposed when necessary. Due to his death
during circulation of his opinion, Judge Becker's decision was
reversed in a rehearing of the case. In denying certiorari of Petruska's
case, the Supreme Court of the United States failed to take
advantage of an opportunity to protect the rights of women in the
religious workplace.
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The Constitution protects religious exercise, and we
decline to turn the Free Exercise Clause into a
license for the free exercise of discrimination un-
moored from religious principle.1
INTRODUCTION
For generations, women everywhere have banged their heads
on the proverbial glass ceiling in the professional marketplace.
Women in the clergy face similar frustrations when pursuing
positions in their chosen religion, where tradition, prejudice, and
governmental protections make it difficult to serve in even a non-
ministerial capacity.2 The plight of women clergy is "exacerbated by
long-standing religious norms about appropriate gender roles."3
Hiring decisions regarding ministers and clergy usually take place
at the local level, where local feelings and traditions can come into
conflict with denominational goals.4 The ability of religious institu-
tions to limit or exclude women from clergy positions is enabled by
congregational self-regulation,5 First Amendment protection under
the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses,6 and judicial interpre-
tation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.' Title VII enables
1. Petruska v. Gannon Univ., No. 05-1222, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 13135, at *28 (3d
Cir. May 24, 2006) (opinion withdrawn by the court). The opinion was vacated and
reheard due to Judge Becker's death shortly after the signing of the original Court of
Appeals opinion. Gannon University filed a sur petition for rehearing, and a panel in the
Third Circuit approved the petition. Petruska v. Gannon Univ., No. 05-1222, 2006 U.S.
App. LEXIS 15088, at *2-3 (3d Cir. June 30, 2006).
2. Laura R. Olson et al., Changing Issue Agendas of Women Clergy, 39 J. SCI. STUDY
RELIGION 140, 142 (2000).
3. Id.
4. Patricia M. Y. Chang, Female Clergy in the Contemporary Protestant Church: A
Current Assessment, 36 J. Sci. STUDY RELIGION 565, 569 (1997) [hereinafter Female
Clergy in the Contemporary Protestant Church]:
Ethically, Christian churches identify themselves with values of justice and
equality. Socially, the issue of women's rights has been affirmed by secular
society and women's ability to perform well in a number of traditionally male
occupations stands as a visible affirmation of these rights. At the same time,
theological interpretations within the Christian tradition are often actively
mobilized to support resistance to a female clergy. In addition to this, his-
torical patterns within Christianity have been dominated by male imagery,
which makes it difficult on a cultural and cognitive level for some laity to
accept female pastors.
5. Edward C. Lehman, Jr., Clergy Women's World: Musings of a Fox, 43 REV.
RELIGIOUS RES. 5, 10-11 (2001).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...").
7. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2000):
This subchapter shall not apply to an employer with respect to the
employment of aliens outside any State, or to a religious corporation,
association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment
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religious institutions, among other organizations, to use broad
discretion in their employment decisions and structure.' First, Title
VII protects religious institutions from employment discrimination
claims when the claim alleges discrimination based on religion.9
Second, as a result of the amendments to Title VII and judicial
interpretations, courts have carved out a constitutional ministerial
exception to analyze a plaintiffs Title VII claim when the sought
after employment position involves primarily religious functions.' °
In some circuits, the ministerial exception has successfully blocked
even preliminary judicial analysis of legitimate claims against
religious organizations" because of fear of entanglement between
church and state. 2 Over half of the federal circuit courts apply a
ministerial exception to cases involving employment with religious
institutions."'
The governmental protection afforded religious entities through
the ministerial exception results in deficient equal opportunity
protection for the employees who work there.14 While the exception
has never been scrutinized by the Supreme Court, 15 many circuits
uphold the ministerial exception's applicability. 6 Recently, a small
crack formed in the employment protection that religious institutions
enjoy. Lynette Petruska, an attorney and a former nun, v attempted
of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the
carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or
society of its activities.
8. 42 U.S.C § 2000e-l(a).
9. Laura L. Coon, Note, Employment Discrimination by Religious Institutions:
Limiting the Sanctuary of the Constitutional Ministerial Exception to Religion-Based
Employment Decisions, 54 VAND. L. REv. 481, 486 (2001).
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 801 (4th Cir.
2000) ("The exception precludes any inquiry whatsoever into the reasons behind a
church's ministerial employment decision. The church need not, for example, proffer any
religious justification for its decision..
12. Coon, supra note 9, at 483-84.
13. Petruska v. Gannon Univ., No. 05-1222, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 13135, at *10 (3d
Cir. May 24, 2006).
14. Telephone Interview with Lynette Petruska, Plaintiff, Petruska v. Gannon Univ.
(Jan. 5, 2007).
15. Petruska, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 13135, at *29.
16. Id. at *10 (citing as examples Werft v. Desert Sw. Annual Conference of the
United Methodist Church, 377 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2004); Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic
Bishop of Chicago, 320 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2003); EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of
Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795 (4th Cir. 2000); Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal
Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2000); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d
455 (D.C. Cir. 1996)) ; Young v. N. Illinois Conference of United Methodist Church, 21
F.3d 184 (7th Cir. 1994); Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d
360 (8th Cir. 1991); Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d
1164 (4th Cir. 1985); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972)).
17. Diana B. Henriques, Where Faith Abides, Employees Have Few Rights, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2006, at Al.
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to take the ministerial exception to the Supreme Court" in order to
battle her gender-based dismissal from her position as University
Chaplain at Gannon University. 9 During the writing of this Note,
the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Petruska's case.20 By doing
this, the Court has allowed confusion to continue among the circuits
and has effectively denied civil liberties to some religious workers.
Part I of this Note will trace the history and development of the
ministerial exception, from its constitutional and judicial origins to
Title VII. Part II will analyze how the judiciary has extended the
ministerial exception beyond the plain language of Title VII and
how some courts have created a safe haven for religious institutions
with respect to employment decisions. Part III will evaluate the
current status of the exception in light of Petruska's case against
Gannon University and its unconventional procedural history and
argument. Part IV will assess the historical and existing experience
for female clergy members and the void that Petruska's case could
have filled if analyzed by the Supreme Court.
The ministerial exception provides an important buffer between
the interests of the state to enforce equal opportunity objectives,2'
and the interest of religious entities to practice and observe their
faith freely.22 Analysis of the late Judge Becker's opinion in Petruska
provides an alternative view of the ability of courts to analyze
employees' discrimination claims against religious institutions when
the claim is not based on religion.23 Application of this view could be
the glimmer of light that shines through the stained glass ceiling.
I. THE HISTORY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MINISTERIAL
EXCEPTION
The balance between Church and State has always been
precarious. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
carves out protections for the freedom of religion based on the Free
18. Id.
19. Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 350 F. Supp. 2d 666, 671 (W.D. Pa. 2004).
20. Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 127 S. Ct. 2098 (2007).
21. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Preamble, 78 Stat. 241 (1964)
(stating its goal is "to prevent discrimination in federally assisted programs, to establish
a Commission on Equal Employment Opportunity...").
22. Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 947 (3d Cir. 1991) ("[Free exercise] is guaranteed not
only to individuals but also to churches in their collective capacities." (quoting Kedroff v.
Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952))).
23. Petruska v. Gannon Univ., No. 05-1222, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 13135, at *43-44
(3d Cir. May 24, 2006) ("The speculative nature of our discussion here demonstrates
why it is premature to foreclose appellant's . . .claim. Once evidence is offered, the
district court will be in a position to control the case so as to protect against any im-
permissible entanglements." (quoting Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of the
United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1990))).
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Exercise and the Establishment Clauses, 24 and it is from the
interpretation of these clauses that the ministerial exception is
based.25 During the Civil Rights movement in the 1960s, the United
States government enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
to grant basic liberties to all citizens.26 The Civil Rights Act, however,
included § 702 (now 42 U.S.C. 2000e- 1), which allows the equal oppor-
tunity employment mandates to apply less stringently to religious
institutions. 27 The intention of this statute was to apply the "pro-
scriptions" and protections of the First Amendment to the judiciary's
governance of disputes and violations of Title VII. 28 Under a plain
reading, the statute only exempted religious organizations "to the
extent they discriminated against employees involved in strictly
religious activities."29 Courts, thus, would not have jurisdiction over
cases involving employees of religious institutions where the claims
of employment discrimination were based on religion. The legislature
expanded the scope of Title VII in 1972, extending the "religious in-
stitution exemption to include all activities of religious institutions,
instead of merely their religious activities."30 This increase in the
scope of Title VII protection has been considered vague and far-
reaching because it includes all employment decisions, even those
touted as profit ventures of the church,"1 such as schools.32
A. McClure v. Salvation Army
McClure v. Salvation Army3 3 was one of the seminal cases on the
ministerial exception as applied to religious institutions.34 McClure
involved a pay and gender discrimination claim by a female Salvation
24. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
25. Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 350 F. Supp. 2d 666, 672 (W.D. Pa. 2004).
26. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Preamble, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
Protections described in the Preamble include the enforcement of the constitutional
right to vote and relief from discrimination.
27. Coon, supra note 9, at 486-87.
28. Petruska, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 672 (citing Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 363
U.S. 190, 191 (1960)).
29. Coon, supra note 9, at 487.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 336-39 (1987) (upholding the constitutionality of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and holding that Title VII does not unfairly advance
religion); see also Coon, supra note 9, at 489-96, for a discussion on the court battles
regarding Title VII.
33. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972).
34. Petruska v. Gannon Univ., No. 05-1222, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 13135, at *10 (3d
Cir. May 24, 2006).
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Army employee.35 McClure argued that because the discrimination
was not based on religion, the Title VII exception should not apply.36
In response to McClure's argument, the court articulated an exception
to a Title VII claim based on the denial of equal employment, known
as the ministerial exception.3 7 Describing the minister-church rela-
tionship as the "lifeblood" of the church,3" the court held that "[t]he
minister is the chief instrument by which the church seeks to fulfill
its purpose. Matters touching this relationship must necessarily be
recognized as of prime ecclesiastical concern."39
The Fifth Circuit hesitated in McClure to apply Title VII's equal
employment demands to the ministerial employment relationship.4"
Jurisdiction over such claims would impermissibly call for judicial
analysis of religious decisions.41 After McClure, religious institutions
enjoyed what amounted to two protections, the exemption under § 702
of Title VII, protecting any employment discrimination based on
religion, and the McClure judicially created ministerial exception,
protecting any employment discrimination in the minister-church
relationship.42
B. Title VII and the Ministerial Exception After EEOC v.
Mississippi College
Eight years after first articulating the ministerial exception in
McClure, the judiciary clarified the scope of the exception in EEOC v.
Mississippi College.43 The court in Mississippi College analyzed Title
VII to determine if it violated the Free Exercise Clause44 when there
was a charge of racial discrimination raised against a private religious
35. McClure, 460 F.2d at 555.
36. Id. at 556; see also Coon, supra note 9, at 497.
37. McClure, 460 F.2d at 558-60.
38. Id. at 558.
39. Id. at 559.
40. Id. at 560.
41. Id. Application of Title VII would "cause the State to intrude upon matters of
church administration and government which have so many times before been proclaimed
to be matters of a singular ecclesiastical concern." Id.
42. Coon, supra note 9, at 503.
43. EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 488 (5th Cir. 1980).
44. Id.
In determining whether a statutory enactment violates the free exercise
of a sincerely held religious belief, the Supreme Court has examined (1) the
magnitude of the statute's impact upon the exercise of the religious belief,
(2) the existence of a compelling state interest justifying the burden imposed
upon the exercise of the religious belief, and (3) the extent to which recog-
nition of an exemption from the statute would impede the objectives sought
to be advanced by the state.
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school.45 The court held that Title VII's statutory exception, found in
§ 702, is limited to discrimination on the basis of religion4" even if the
religious discrimination is simply pretextual to a racial bias.47 The
EEOC argued that Title VII would not require excessive government
involvement48 and that the statute did not enable religious institutions
to disregard equal employment mandates.49 The court ruled that if the
religious organization presented sufficient evidence that the chal-
lenged employment practice was a result of discrimination on the
basis of religion, the EEOC was not permitted to further investigate
the challenged practice.5"
The court in Mississippi College also extended Title VII to
religious organizations' employment practices in their non-religious
ventures.51 Thus, a religious organization had full discretion in its
employment decisions, as long as any discrimination displayed had
a basis in religious belief, despite a possible foundation in sexual or
racial bias.5
The case of Rayburn v. Seventh-Day Adventists53 presented
another broad caveat to the religious employment exemptions
under Title VII and the First Amendment. Additionally, the court in
Rayburn articulated a test to evaluate the application of the ministe-
rial exception when raised as a defense by religious institutions.54 In
Rayburn, the Fourth Circuit employed the protections of the First
Amendment to hold that a church organization was "immune" from a
gender discrimination claim under Title VII stemming from the
organization's refusal to hire a female for a clergy position.55 The court
recognized that the language of § 702 does not grant the freedom to
make hiring decisions based on race, sex, or national origin and that
the legislative intent of the statutory exemption was limited to
religious predilections.56 Despite the Fourth Circuit's recognition of
the narrowness of the exception, the court barred the gender-based
discrimination claim.57 In arriving at this decision, the Rayburn
court developed a test, known as the 'primary duties of the plaintiff
45. Id. at 481.
46. Id. at 485-86.
47. Id. at 489.
48. Id. at 486.
49. Id. at 484.
50. Id. at 485.
51. Coon, supra note 9, at 497.
52. Id. at 499.
53. Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir.
1985).
54. Coon, supra note 9, at 503.
55. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169-70.
56. Id. at 1166.
57. Id. at 1172.
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test," that has since been relied upon to determine the application
of the ministerial exception.5"
To define to whom the ministerial exception should apply, the
court first "looked to the function of the plaintiffs current or desired
employment position." 9 The court found that a person should be con-
sidered a member of the clergy, and the ministerial exception should
apply, "if the employee's primary duties consist of teaching, spreading
the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, or super-
vision or participation in a ritual and worship."6 Thus, the court
must find the employee's position "sufficiently spiritual" to find the
exception.6' Arguably, this extends the ministerial exception far
beyond the person standing at the pulpit on Sunday, to include aid
workers in religious community outreach programs, Sunday school
teachers, and teachers at religious institutions, among others.'
C. Rationales Behind the Constitutional Reliance of the Courts on
the Ministerial Exception
The courts rely on various rationales to support their reluctance
to delve into the minister-church employment relationship. One, the
"government scrutiny rationale," based on the Establishment Clause,
holds that the exception is necessary to avoid government entangle-
ment between church and state and to prevent government question-
ing of church administrative dealings.63 Under the second rationale,
the "selection of clergy" rationale, courts rely on the idea that churches
should be free to choose their own religious leaders." Specifically, the
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, applying the "selection of
clergy" rationale, reasoned that "the minister is the chief instrument
by which the church seeks to fulfill its purpose,"65 and as such, the
minister should remain separate from the state.66 A third rationale,
58. Coon, supra note 9, at 503.
59. Id. at 504.
60. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169 (quoting Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination in the Name
of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation of Discrimination by Religious Organizations, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 1514, 1545 (1979)).
61. Coon, supra note 9, at 505.
62. Steven K. Green, The Ambiguity of Neutrality, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 692, 722-23
(2000) (reviewing CHARLES L. GLENN, THE AMBIGUOUS EMBRACE: GOVERNMENT AND
FAITH-BASED SCHOOLS AND SOCIAL AGENCIES (2000)).
63. Petruska v. Gannon Univ., No. 05-1222, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 13135, at *13-14
(3d Cir. May 24, 2006).
64. Id. at *15.
65. Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 203 F.3d 1299, 1304 (11th
Cir. 2000) (quoting McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558-59 (5th Cir. 1972)).
66. Id. ("An attempt by the government to regulate the relationship between a church
and its clergy would infringe upon the church's right to be the sole governing body of its
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the "inquiry into religious doctrine" rationale, is based on the fear of
a secular government making faith determinations.67 Implementation
ofjudicial standards would burden the free exercise of religion and the
state's interest would not be strong enough to overcome the detriment
to the Constitution. 8
II. EXPANSION OF THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION BEYOND
RELIGION-BASED DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
Following the holdings in McClure,6 9 Mississippi College,7° and
Rayburn,7 courts have taken it upon themselves to adapt the religious
exemptions under Title VII and the ministerial exception.72 Though
the language of Title VII appears narrow, there has been new judicial
expansion of its protections from its original scope.73 This expansion
has occurred through case law, as courts are given the option to
quickly raise jurisdictional concerns under the ministerial exception.
One of the most important cases with respect to the expansion
of Title VII protection is that of Corporation of the Presiding Bishop
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos.74 The
appellee, Mayson, an assistant building engineer for a church-run
gymnasium, was fired for failing to acquire a certificate showing his
membership in the Mormon church.75 Mayson argued that if "con-
strued to allow religious employers to discriminate on religious
grounds in hiring for nonreligious jobs, § 702 [would violate] the
ecclesiastical rules and religious doctrine.").
67. Petruska, 2006 U.S. App. 13135 LEXIS, at *16.
68. Theresa J. Fuentes, Title VII, Religious Freedom, and the Case of the Nontenured
Nun, in Constitutional Law, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 727, 745 (1997) (quoting EEOC v.
Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d 455, 467 (1996)).
69. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972).
70. EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980).
71. Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir.
1985).
72. Marci A. Hamilton, Religious Institutions, the No-Harm Doctrine, and the Public
Good, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1099, 1193-96 (2004). "The ministerial exception.., is a judicial
invention that has been used at times to extend Congress's exemption for discrim-
ination on the basis of religious belief to other types of discrimination." Id. at 1195; see
also Angela C. Carmella, The Protection of Children and Young People: Catholic and
Constitutional Visions of Responsible Freedom, 44 B.C. L. REV 1031, 1039 (2003)
(discussing the inability of women to make sexual harassment claims against their
clergy employers).
73. Michael Kavey, Note, Private Voucher Schools and the First Amendment Right
to Discriminate, 113 YALE L.J. 743, 781 (2003) (citing Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of
Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985)).
74. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
75. Id. at 330.
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Establishment Clause."76 The Supreme Court, however, rejected this
argument, overruling the district court, and found that § 702 of Title
VII was constitutional77 under the Establishment Clause. 78 Con-
cerned with church autonomy, Justice Brennan, in his concurring
opinion, reasoned that the judiciary should "avoid the entanglement
and the chill on religious expression that a case-by-case determina-
tion would produce."79 In spite of the fact that the duties did not
involve spreading and proclaiming the faith, the Court in Amos
found that § 702 permitted a religious entity to discriminate in any
activity associated with church employment.' Justice Brennan, in his
concurrence, went so far as to advocate a "categorical rule" for employ-
ees of religious non-profit ventures, to protect religious institutions'
employment discretion rights."1
The ministerial exception faced its first major Supreme Court
challenge in Employment Division v. Smith.82 In Smith, the respon-
dents, members of the Native American Church, were fired from their
jobs with a private drug rehabilitation organization for their use of
peyote, a natural hallucinogenic drug used for sacrament in the
76. Id. at 331.
77. Id. at 330. The test applied by the district court was as follows:
First, the court must look at the tie between the religious organization and
the activity at issue with regard to such areas as financial affairs, day-to-
day operations and management. Second, whether or not there is a close
and substantial tie between the two, the court next must examine the
nexus between the primary function of the activity in question and the re-
ligious rituals or tenets of the religious organization or matters of church
administration. . . . [W]here the tie between the religious entity and
activity in question is either close or remote under the first prong of the
test and the nexus between the primary function of the activity in question
and the religious tenets or rituals of the religious organization or matters
of church administration is tenuous or non-existent, the court must engage
in a third inquiry. It must consider the relationship between the nature of
the job the employee is performing and the religious rituals or tenets of the
religious organization or matters of church administration. If there is a
substantial relationship between the employee's job and church adminis-
tration or the religious organization's rituals or tenets, the court must find
that the activity in question is religious. If the relationship is not substantial,
the activity is not religious.
Id. at 332 n.6. The district court then applied the Lemon test. Id. at 332-334. The Lemon
test requires: (1) the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; (2) its primary
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; (3) the statute must not
foster an excessive government entanglement with religion. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
78. Amos, 483 U.S. at 339.
79. Id. at 345 (Brennan, J., concurring).
80. Coon, supra note 9, at 496.
81. Amos, 483 U.S. at 345-46 (Brennan, J., concurring).
82. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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Native American Church. 3 As a result of the respondents' alleged
misconduct, the respondents were denied unemployment benefits
because Oregon had outlawed the use of peyote.' The respondents
argued that '"prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]' includes
requiring an individual to observe a generally applicable law that re-
quires (or forbids) the performance of an act that his religious belief
forbids (or requires)."8 5 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, deter-
mined that the Free Exercise Clause was not violated by the state's
regulation of peyote.' In so holding, the Court reasoned that the law
was not a directive aimed at religious beliefs * and that an individual
cannot raise the Free Exercise Clause as a defense against a neutral
law. 8 According to the Court, while there are many religious values,
beliefs, and practices that should be protected, they should be pro-
tected through the political process, rather than the judicial process.8 "
Thus, Smith stands for the proposition that a blanket "nondiscrimi-
natory religious-practice exemption" is not "permitted" or "desirable."0
The dissent viewed the Court's opinion as a departure from
existing methods of protecting the free exercise of religion from
infringement by the state.91 Justice Blackmun believed that
"Oregon's interest in enforcing its drug laws against religious use of
peyote [was] not sufficiently compelling to outweigh respondents'
free exercise of their religion."92 In so finding, the dissent articu-
lated the position of religious institutions that there should be broad
protection of religious practices under the Free Exercise clause. 93
A. Survival of the Ministerial Exception After the Holding in
Employment Division v. Smith
The majority in Smith recognized that the Free Exercise Clause
is limited in its ability to exempt religious practices and decisions
83. Id. at 874.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 878.
86. Id. at 890.
87. Id. at 885.
88. Id. at 878-79. "mhe right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the ob-
ligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground
that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)"
Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
89. Id. at 890
90. Id.
91. Id. at 907-08 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 921 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 909-21 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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from state regulations.9 4 Following Smith, Title VII could be inter-
preted to apply equally to civil servants despite the spiritual or secular
nature of their work.95 The requirement that the statue supported
a compelling state interest was no longer necessary when a law was
neutral in its application.96
Smith dispelled the idea of a judicially-crafted exception from
a neutral statute.9 7 Many religious institutions condemned the ap-
plication of these statutes and fought for federal legislation.98 The
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) was a result of their
efforts.99 Though RFRA was limited in Boerne v. Flores as applicable
to state law only, 1' ° Boerne still enabled courts to accommodate
religious institutions through other legislative protections, such as
the federally enacted § 702.1°" The decision in Smith was criticized
and circumvented by subsequent cases.0 2
Judicially, the ministerial exception continues to be applied
despite the holding in Smith. °3 Circuit courts have maneuvered
around the holding in many ways. For example, the D.C. Circuit
Court held that although the right of free exercise does not excuse
an individual from complying with a valid and neutral law, it does
not follow from the holding in Smith "that a church may never be
relieved of the obligation."''0 4 It has also been argued that the minis-
terial exception rests not on a compelling interest of the state, but
on the basic idea of protection of church doctrine and religious
94. William B. Turner, Note, Putting the Contract into Contractions: Reproductive
Rights and the Founding of the Republic, 2005 Wis. L. REv. 1535, 1600 (2005) ('The implicit
point of the Smith decision... is a thoroughly Lockean one: institutions and organi-
zations that accept the benefits of government must also accept certain limitations.").
95. Carol M. Kaplan, Note, The Devil is in the Details: Neutral, Generally Applicable
Laws, and Exceptions from Smith, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1071 (2000).
96. Smith, 494 U.S. at 892-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
97. Hamilton, supra note 72, at 1195 ("[C]ourts are not competent to carve out
individual exemptions from generally applicable laws; that is the province of the
legislature. That is the explicit holding in Smith.").
98. Id. at 1108.
99. Id.
100. Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
101. Coon, supra note 9, at 489 n.26 (discussing City of Boerne's finding that there
is a sphere of constitutional "accommodation" for different aspects of religion even
when that protection is not specifically outlined in the Free Exercise Clause (citing
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 516-20)).
102. See Michael E. Lechliter, Note, The Free Exercise of Religion and Public Schools:
The Implications of Hybrid Rights on the Religious Upbringing of Children, 103 MICH.
L. REv. 2209, 2222-28 (2005) for a discussion of cases criticizing and circumventing the
decision in Smith.
103. Kavey, supra note 73, at 780. Several appellate courts have held that the min-
isterial exception has not been overruled and the selection of clergy is protected by the
Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause.
104. EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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practices.° 5 Circuit courts continue to apply the ministerial exception
to religion-neutral laws, and Smith has effectively been disregarded. 1 06
The Smith backlash highlights the heightened decision-making
role of the judiciary in ministerial exception cases. It would appear
that the ministerial exception is a judicial extension of Title VII's
protections of religious beliefs. Judicial failure to heed Smith exem-
plifies the judiciary's perceived "authority to ensure that .. . civil
rights laws include exemptions for core religious liberty interests.' 0 7
B. The Current Status of the Ministerial Exception Within the
Circuits
Many of the circuits continue to apply the ministerial excep-
tion.' Its proponents demand that the judiciary defend the First
Amendment free exercise activity of religious institutions and they
argue that religious institutions' employment decisions should be
immune from State governance.0 9 Under this logic, the interests of
groups such as churches "should be absolutely protected when the
interest is directly linked to internal matters of the religious commu-
nity.""' Fears pervade among the different circuits about the entan-
glement of judicial determinations of fact and religious doctrine."'
The fundamental need for separation of church and state is clear,
though the degree of application of the ministerial exception has
varied. 2 The ease in which it can be applied in some circuits can
leave civil servants without recourse for a termination unrelated to
church dogma. Petruska v. Gannon University"' provided an oppor-
tunity for the Supreme Court to clarify the ministerial exception. On
April 27, 2007, however, certiorari was denied." 4 In refusing to hear
the case, the Court has allowed for the continued twisting of Smith's
holding by the lower courts. Petruska's case presented a classic
105. Id. at 462-63.
106. Nelson Tebbe, Free Exercise and the Problem of Symmetry, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 699,
734 (2005) ("Ministerial exemptions.., inexplicably persist after Smith even though the
civil rights statutes are not aimed at religion.").
107. Jack S. Vaitayanonta, Note, In State Legislatures We Trust?: The "Compelling
Interest" Presumption and Religious Free Exercise Challenges to State Civil Rights
Laws, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 886, 924 (2001).
108. Petruska v. Gannon Univ., No. 05-1222, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 13135, at *1 (3d
Cir. May 24, 2006).
109. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558-59 (5th Cir. 1972).
110. Vaitayanonta, supra note 107, at 923.
111. Fuentes, supra note 68, at 744.
112. Hamilton, supra note 72, at 1193.
113. Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 350 F. Supp. 2d 666 (W.D. Pa. 2004).
114. Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 127 S. Ct. 2098 (2007).
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situation in which a religious employee's civil rights were subverted
to the fears of mingling church and state.
III. PETRUSKA'S CASE AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR THE MINISTERIAL
EXCEPTION
Lynette Petruska was hired by Gannon University in 1997 as
director of the University's Center for Social Concerns." 5 Petruska,
who was then a nun as well as an attorney,"6 was told by the
University that the workplace was an equal opportunity environ-
ment, especially with respect to gender." 7 Shortly after Petruska
was hired, she was asked to serve as the University Chaplain while
Chaplain Rouch was out of the country on a period of study."'
Although this position was not necessarily a high-powered position,
it did place Petruska on the president's staff."9 Petruska accepted
the position as Chaplain for the University with assurances from the
University President, David Rubino, that she would not "be replaced
when a male became available to fill the position, or... when Rouch
returned from Rome." 2 ° Petruska sought these assurances because
she had observed women being removed from leadership positions
in the past. 2' Petruska's appointment as Chaplain for the University
demonstrated that Gannon University did not have any doctrinal
objection to a woman serving as Chaplain.'22
A contentious environment developed after President Rubino
took a leave of absence when a sexual affair came to light. 2 ' Chaplain
Petruska helped uncover further allegations of sexual harassment
against Rubino resulting in Rubino's resignation.'24 According to
Petruska, a cover-up then ensued to hide the wrong-doings and
sexual misconduct from the public and members of the University.'25
Petruska was "vocal in opposing this and other of the Administration's
policies and procedures which she viewed as discriminatory toward
females."'26
115. Petruska, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 670.
116. Henriques, supra note 17.
117. Petruska, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 670.
118. Id.
119. Telephone Interview with Lynette Petruska, supra note 14.
120. First Amended Complaint at 6, Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 350 F. Supp. 2d 666
(W.D. Pa. 2004) (No. 1:04:cv-0080-SJM).
121. Id. at 7-9.
122. E-mail from Lynette Petruska, Plaintiff, Petruska v. Gannon Univ. (Oct. 25,2007,
22:18 EST) (on file with author).
123. First Amended Complaint, supra note 120, at 7.
124. Petruska, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 670-71.
125. Id. at 670.
126. Id.
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Petruska was pressured to remove items from a report she
assisted in submitting that documented the gender inequality at
the University.127 She refused, and in retaliation for this action,
128
Petruska alleged that a meeting took place where Bishop Trautman
instructed the newly appointed President Ostrowski to remove
Petruska as chaplain or restructure her position to put her under
Rouch.' 29 Ostrowski refused to comply. 3 ° Though the University
argued that these changes were just in title and not in status, the
change would have removed Petruska from the President's staff.'
Ostrowski conceded that the restructuring was because of Petruska's
gender.'32 Soon after, Bishop Trautman decided to "clean house" by
removing the Executive Director of Admissions, the acting Provost,
and the University Chaplain, all of whom were females.'33
Despite these threats, Petruska continued to call the Bishop's
attention to actions by priests that she thought were inappropriate."M
Petruska's duties were reigned in'35 and she believed that she was "de-
moted not only because she [was] a woman, but because she [was] a
woman who dared to challenge the propriety of the Board."'36 Based
on communications with Antoine Garibaldi, the new president of
Gannon University, Petruska believed that she would be fired for rais-
ing her concerns about discrimination, and as a result of this belief,
Petruska resigned from her position.'37 Despite submitting two weeks'
notice, Petruska was told to leave the premises immediately.
138
Following her resignation, Petruska alleged that she was treated
differently than other male employees of the University, namely
priests, who were forced to resign in the past.3 9 Specifically, Petruska
alleged that she was banned from the campus whereas priests who
had been accused of sexual misconduct were not. 40 Additionally, state-
ments were made to students and faculty that a woman would not be
127. Id. at 670-71.
128. Id. at 671.
129. First Amended Complaint, supra note 120, at 8.
130. Id.
131. Telephone Interview with Lynette Petruska, supra note 14.
132. Petruska, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 671; see also First Amended Complaint, supra note
120, at 9.
133. First Amended Complaint, supra note 120, at 10.
134. Id. at 12.
135. Id. at 11.
136. Id. at 12.
137. Petruska, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 671.
138. Id.
139. First Amended Complaint, supra note 120, at 18.
140. Id. at 18-19.
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considered for Petruska's replacement, 141 highlighting the fact, accord-
ing to Petruska, that her original demotion was based on gender.142
Petruska's complaint against the University raised both state
law claims as well as claims of retaliatory and gender-based discrimi-
nation in violation of Title VII.143 Specifically, Petruska asserted six
theories for recovery including: (1) Title VII Gender Discrimination
Against All Defendants, (2) Title VII Retaliatory Discrimination
Against All Defendants, (3) Fraudulent Misrepresentation, (4) Civil
Conspiracy, (5) Breach of Contract, and (6) Negligent Supervision and
Retention of Various Employees.144 Gannon University and the other
named defendants (including the Board of Trustees, Bishop Trautman,
former President Rubino, current President Garibaldi, and Vice
President Rouch) moved to dismiss all of these claims on the ground
that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the minis-
terial exception.
141
The motion to dismiss Petruska's First Amended Complaint
was argued before the District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania. 4 6 Judge McLaughlin, writing for the court, first noted
that the defendants' motion presented a facial challenge to the court's
subject matter jurisdiction and, as such, the court was required to
consider the allegations in Petruska's complaint as true.'47 Judge
McLaughlin, however, recognized that it was ultimately Petruska's
burden to establish that the court had jurisdiction. 4 ' Applying these
principals, Judge McLaughlin then analyzed the impact and extent
of the ministerial exception and, thus, the lynchpin issue of whether
the court had jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs claims.'49
Judge McLaughlin traced the ministerial exception from its roots
in the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause to the
present day interpretation.'50 After surveying and analyzing a num-
ber of court decisions regarding employment discrimination claims
against churches by ministers,' 5 ' Judge McLaughlin found that the
guard against judicial involvement in the ministerial relationship, pro-
tected by the ministerial exception, extended to "any matters 'touching
this relationship.""52 While first noting that the controlling Third
141. Petruska, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 672.
142. First Amended Complaint, supra note 120, at 9.
143. Petruska, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 668.
144. Id. at 672.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 668.
147. Id. at 669.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 672-85.
150. Id. at 672-73.
151. Id. at 673-75.
152. Id. at 674.
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Circuit had not adopted the ministerial exception, the district court
determined that under "appropriate circumstances" the exception
would apply to keep civil rights claims out of the court system.
153
After recognizing the ministerial exception as valid, Judge
McLaughlin then analyzed whether the ministerial exception was
applicable to Petruska's claims. Judge McLaughlin first found that
Petruska's duties were ministerial in nature,' despite the fact that
Petruska would not have been deemed a minister in her own church,
the Catholic church, where the role is reserved for males. 5 ' The court
found that Petruska's role on the Catholic Identity Task Force and
her holding of prayer services were sufficiently ministerial."'5 Judge
McLaughlin did not find it significant that the reason for Petruska's
dismissal was unrelated to religious doctrine, as the focus of the minis-
terial exception is on the action taken and not the motives.'57 Thus,
the ministerial exception would halt any investigation into employ-
ment motivations by the court.'58
The district court then analyzed the impact of Employment
Division v. Smith'59 upon the invocation of the ministerial exception
by Gannon University.6 ° Relying upon the decisions of other federal
district courts, Judge McLaughlin found that the Smith decision did
not "undermine the viability of the ministerial exception."''
Finally, the district court refused to waive the ministerial excep-
tion in Petruska's case, despite Gannon's self-promotion as an equal
opportunity employer.'62 Petruska claimed that these representations
and the receipt of public funding constituted a waiver of Gannon's
First Amendment protections.'63 The district court declined to find
a waiver of First Amendment protections through the acceptance of
federal funds, as a waiver needs to be knowing and intelligent.
6 4
Welter v. Seton Hall University,165 cited by the Plaintiff, discussed
the importance of the ministerial exception. The court in Welter stated
153. Id. at 674-75.
154. Id. at 677.
155. Id. at 675.
156. Id. at 676-77.
157. Id. at 677.
158. Id.
159. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
160. Petruska, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 678.
161. Id. at 678 (relying upon the fact that a different aspect of the free exercise of
religion was at issue in Smith and that the ministerial exception does not address the
same concerns).
162. Id. at 679.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 679-80.
165. Welter v. Seton Hall Univ., 608 A.2d 206, 212-15 (N.J. 1992).
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that "[i]n appropriate circumstances a court may apply neutral prin-
ciples of law to determine disputed questions that do not implicate
religious doctrine."' 6 The Supreme Court of New Jersey noted that
the rights of a religious institution to free exercise in employment
decisions under religious doctrine could be "bargained away.' 67 While
the district court held that the ministerial exception may be waived
because it is judicially-made law, the high standard for waivers of
constitutional rights was not met by Gannon University.6 '
As no issue of waiver existed, the court held that it did not have
jurisdiction to hear Petruska's claims.'69 Thus, the court was not per-
mitted to question whether Gannon University's motives were related
to Petruska's gender or were retaliatory in nature.17 It would appear
from the court's reasoning that an association between the motives
and the doctrine of the Catholic church was not needed.' 7 ' Judge
McLaughlin found that unfortunately for Petruska, and other religious
servants in the district, whether Gannon University's motives were
misguided did not matter with respect to equal employment under
Title VII.
172
Though the court acknowledged that there was "potential for
abuse,"'73 there were safeguards in place for people and actions that
fell outside of the ministerial exception, namely sexual harassment
claims under Title VII.174 In finding that sexual harassment fell out-
side the scope of the ministerial exception, the court relied upon the
case of Bollard v. California Province of the Society of Jesus.7 1 Sub-
sequent case law, however, casts doubt on the ability of the judiciary
to maintain these distinctions in the context of the ministerial ex-
ception.176 Petruska's claim was denied as the court failed to address
her complaint because of an alleged lack of jurisdiction.'7
166. Id. at 212.
167. Id. at 214.
168. Petruska, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 680-82.
169. Id. at 683.
170. Id.
171. Petruska herself had served as chaplain.
172. Petruska, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 683.
173. Id. at 684.
174. Id. at 684-85.
175. Id. at 685; Bollard v. California Province of the Soc'y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940 (9th
Cir. 1999).
176. See Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299,
1303-04 (1 1th Cir. 2000) (affirming the dismissal of a minister's Title VII retaliation and
constructive discharge claims); see also First Amended Complaint, supra note 120, at 7
(though Petruska herself was not sexually harassed, she was "instrumental" in bringing
sexual harassment claims to the attention of her superiors).
177. Petruska, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 685.
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Petruska appealed her case to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit, where it was argued on October 20, 2005.178 In
a surprising opinion by the late Honorable Judge Edward R. Becker,
the Third Circuit reversed the lower court's decision concerning juris-
diction over the case.
179
The court held that the scope of the ministerial exception in the
Third Circuit should be "carefully tailored" and found that "[w]here
otherwise illegal discrimination is based on religious belief, religious
doctrine, or the internal regulations of a church, the First Amendment
exempts religious institutions from Title VII. ' " ° The court further
held that discrimination unrelated to religion was not protected under
the ministerial exception and did not foreclose Title VII suits."1 Judge
Becker recognized that although six of his sister circuits apply the
ministerial exception when the discrimination is not based in reli-
gion,182 application in the Third Circuit must take into account the
government's interest in fair employment. 8 3
In a rather frank opinion, Judge Becker recognized the reasons
the Constitution requires the ministerial exception to protect the First
Amendment rights of religious institutions.8 4 In addition, Judge
Becker explained why the circumstances presented in this case were
different from the cases in which the ministerial exception applied."8 5
The court noted that the ministerial exception is necessary to avoid
'government scrutiny' into the operations of religious institutions,
that churches should be free in the selection of their clergy, and that
courts should not be put in the position of resolving questions of
religious doctrine.8 6
The issue in Petruska was "whether a ministerial employee may
bring suit under Title VII where the religious institution lacks a ratio-
nale for the employment action that is grounded in faith, doctrine,
or internal regulation."'187 The court found that the legislature did
not give religious institutions the blanket right to discriminate based
on gender.88 Despite the fact that decisions in different circuits held
178. Petruska v. Gannon Univ., No. 05-1222, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 13135 (3d Cir.
May 24, 2006).
179. Id. at *56-57.
180. Id. at *2.
181. Id.
182. Id. at *10.
183. Id. at *2-3.
184. Id. at *9-16.
185. Id. at *27-28.
186. Id. at *13-16.
187. Id. at *22-23.
188. Id. at *25.
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that "employer's reasons are irrelevant to the ministerial exception,"'"
Judge Becker forced the Third Circuit to delineate based on that dis-
tinction.' In support of Petruska, and other religious civil servants
within the jurisdiction of the Third Circuit, the court "decline[d] to
turn the Free Exercise Clause into a license for the free exercise of
discrimination unmoored from religious principle."'91 Thus, in order
to apply the ministerial exception in the Third Circuit, the employ-
ment decision must be motivated by religious belief, religious doctrine,
or church regulation.'92 If the law does not reach into their doctrine,
religious organizations should adhere to neutral laws. 9 '
The Third Circuit held that based on Petruska's complaint, analy-
sis of her claim would not necessarily involve examination of religious
doctrine.'94 The district court could refrain from determining religious
questions if church doctrine and practice were not implicated.195 It
would appear that the court did not view this as a circumstance in
which the Catholic religion barred women from chaplain positions, as
Gannon University had appointed Petruska as University Chaplain.96
When religious doctrine is not implicated, the court held that the ex-
ception should be construed narrowly so that the court is "cut[ting]
with a scalpel, not a butcher's knife."' 97 Fear or "mere speculation"
that some religious worker's claims may present First Amendment
problems in the future should not bar the court from asserting juris-
diction. 9 ' Judicial analysis of non-doctrinal decisions does not impact
a religious institution's free exercise rights,' and at that early stage
of litigation, there is no entanglement between church and state. 00
Judge Becker, thus, concluded that the district courts of the Third
Circuit could determine whether a piece of evidence invoked a reli-
gious doctrine.2 ' Therefore, no reason existed to prematurely deny
jurisdiction in cases seeking to protect civil liberties.0 2
The civil rights of employees in religious institutions, through
this opinion, can still be argued in the judicial system when the
189. Id. at *28.
190. Id.
191. Id. at *28.
192. Id.
193. Id. at *35.
194. Id. at *37.
195. Id. at *41.
196. Id. at *5.
197. Id. at *45.
198. Id.
199. Id. at *47.
200. Id. at *50.
201. Id. at *44.
202. Id.
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question is not one of religious canon. This parallels Petruska's belief
that "before we should impose the First Amendment exceptions we
should look to see if dogma is implicated, or otherwise it is just dis-
crimination masquerading as religion. 2 °3
The internal operating rules of the Third Circuit require that an
opinion be in circulation for eight days.2° Judge Becker's opinion was
circulated to the full court for five days when he passed away.205 Due
to the failure to satisfy the eight-day minimum, a sur petition by the
Respondent, Gannon University and other named defendants, for
rehearing was granted,206 and Judge Becker's opinion was vacated
on June 20, 2006.207
In the rehearing, the Honorable Judge Smith, who dissented in
the original hearing, wrote the opinion for the court.20 Relying on his
analysis in his previous dissent, Judge Smith upheld the decision of
the district court, finding the ministerial exception applicable and
concluding the exception "is akin to a government official's defense
of qualified immunity."209 Judge Smith, unlike the late Judge Becker,
was deeply influenced by actions taken by other circuits who feared
even the slightest risk that Title VII would violate the First Amend-
ment rights of religious institutions.210
Judge Smith found that the history of the ministerial exception
did not allow religious institutions free reign to discriminate on the
basis of gender.211 Despite this, the court held that the First Amend-
ment protected "the act of a decision rather than a motivation behind
it." 212 Judge Smith did not see how the state could remain separate
from the church when analyzing motivations behind religious employ-
ment decisions.213
203. Telephone Interview with Lynette Petruska, supra note 14.
204. 3RD CIR. R. 5.5.2, available at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/Rules/IOP-Final.pdf.
205. Telephone Interview with Lynette Petruska, supra note 14.
206. Petruska v. Gannon Univ., No. 05-1222, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 15088 (3d Cir.
June 30, 2006). Another opinion of Judge Becker's was in circulation for less than eight
days, but the decision was not vacated because the issue was not raised. Petruska argued
that if you need to have a live judge to validate the opinion, then the rule should apply
to all affected opinions. She petitioned that the judge need only be alive when sitting on
the bench. Telephone Interview with Lynette Petruska, supra note 14.
207. Petruska, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 15088.
208. Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 2006).
209. Id. at 302.
210. Id. at 303-04.
211. Id. at 303-04 n.4 (citing Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists,
772 F.2d 1164, 1167 (4th Cir. 1985)).
212. Id. at 304 n.7 (citing Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772
F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985)).
213. Id. (citing other circuit court opinions that feared that any examination by the
judiciary violates the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause rights of
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Judge Smith agreed that the exception to Title VII for religious
institutions should be narrow, 14 but saw the narrowness as satisfied
through the exclusive application to ministers.215 The appellate court
saw the protection of a religious institution's right to hire and fire its
ministers as paramount to that religious institution's free speech, thus
trumping an individual's rights to equal employment."' Gannon's
choice to change Petruska's position and restructure the department
"constituted a decision about who would perform spiritual functions
and about how those functions would be divided." '217 As Petruska
was a "ministerial" employee, the court concluded that it was pre-
cluded from any investigation into Gannon's possibly inappropriate
motives.218
The loss of the second battle in the appellate court did not sur-
prise Petruska.219 If Gannon had lost, however, the Catholic church
could have pressured the University not to appeal the decision to the
Supreme Court.22 ° A loss in the Supreme Court would hurt the liberty
of the Church's employment decisions in every circuit, not just in the
Third Circuit.221 Petruska and her attorneys then decided to take
her plight for civil liberties to the Supreme Court.22 2
In bringing her case to the Supreme Court, Petruska had two
motives. First, it was Petruska's firm belief that churches should op-
erate as other employers do.223 To Petruska, Title VII is a neutral
law and an exception should not keep thousands of church workers
separated from their civil rights.224 Second, Petruska wished to draw
national focus to the problems that she saw with institutionalized
religions that have protection from the law, particularly the Catholic
faith.225 Her experience as a nun in the Catholic church exposed her
religious organizations). The court quoted the Eleventh Circuit for the proposition that
"the constitutional protection of religious freedom afforded to churches in employment
actions involving clergy exists even when such actions are not based on issues of church
doctrine or ecclesiastical law." Id. at 305 n.7 (quoting Gellington v. Christian Methodist
Episcopal Church, 203 F.3d 1299, 1303 (llth Cir. 2000)).
214. Petruska, 462 F.3d at 305.
215. Id. at 312.
216. Id. at 306-307.
217. Id. at 307-308. The court remanded Petruska's breach of contract and fraud claims,
as the ministerial exception would not apply and disposition of the claims would not
require the court to delve into religious dogma. Id. at 312.
218. Id. at 312.
219. Telephone Interview with Lynette Petruska, supra note 14.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. Ms. Petruska planned to file her petition on January 16, 2007.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
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to an "ongoing cover-up of priest sexual misconduct," where the
ministerial exception was just one more enabling safeguard. 226 From
Petruska's perspective, if she was given a chance to tell the truth
about the priest misconduct as she experienced it, she would win.227
According to Petruska, the blatant cover-ups by the Catholic church
served to disillusion her both as a nun and as a Catholic.228
These goals could have been accomplished through Petruska's
day in the Supreme Court. Though the chances of any case being
granted certiorari are very slim, the issue presented in Petruska's
case is one of great importance. There have been particular circuit
splits, and the Supreme Court has not addressed the overall idea of
an exception in over thirty years. 229 Now that the Supreme Court has
denied certiorari to hear Petruska's case, the ministerial exception
may not be addressed for many more years to come. This issue "has
developed, and now it has developed into a muddle and [Petruska] is
a good case that illustrates the confusion." 230 The lower courts have
clearly shown their need for guidance, as the ministerial exception
has percolated for a long period of time.2 1 Additionally, the Supreme
Court has historically shown a great deal of respect for Judge Becker's
opinions.2 32
Critics of the ministerial exception saw Petruska not only as a
chance for clarification, but also as an opportunity to bring to light
the follies of the ministerial exception.233 When the exception goes too
far, it "wrongly puts courts in the shoes of the legislature. 234 Congress
did not provide an exception from equal employment requirements
for non-doctrinally motivated employment discrimination.235 If the
Supreme Court ruled in favor of Petruska, religious institutions
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. Petruska is no longer a nun or a practicing Catholic. She is now a full-time
lawyer, working in St. Louis, Missouri. Her frustration stems from the fact that she
"can't get the laws of this country enforced for [herself], but [priests] can violate the rules
of their diocese and nothing happens."
229. Telephone Interview with Marci Hamilton, Professor of Law, Cardozo School of
Law (Jan. 17, 2007). Ms. Hamilton also assisted in Petruska's case and represented her
in front of the Supreme Court.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.; see also Tim Weiner, Edward R. Becker, 73, Judge on Federal Court of Appeals,
N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2006, at D8.
233. E-mail from Lynette Petruska, supra note 122.
234. Marci Hamilton, A Federal Trial Court Dismisses a Nun-Priest Sexual Harassment
Claim: A Dubious Case for Invocation of the 'Ministerial Exception,' FIND LAW, Jan. 27,
2005, available at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20050127.html.
235. Id.
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demanding exceptions to anti-discrimination laws would have been
forced to return to Congress for broader statutory protections.236
Additionally, some critics saw Petruska as yet another example
of the high level of deference given to religious institutions, despite
private, and sometimes public, indiscretions." ' Clergy sexual abuse
scandals concern the public, particularly when cover-ups are brought
to light.2 38 Fear that these transgressions continue, and go unpun-
ished, has brought scrutiny upon religious institutions.2 39 Feelings of
resentment also surround the protections that religious institutions
have from investigation.2 40 America is an ordered democracy with laws
upheld by the government, and some believe that strong religious
institutions operate in contrast to that political ideal of fairness.241
The mentality of those who criticize the ministerial exception is
one that advocates the Court's decision in Bob Jones University v.
United States.242 In Bob Jones University, the Supreme Court held
that Bob Jones University was not permitted to discriminate on the
basis of race while receiving federal funds.243 In addition to finding
that racial discrimination was against public policy,244 the case also
exemplifies the balancing of liberty interests between religious inter-
est and public policy. 2
45
Petruska's case and claim against the Catholic institution of
Gannon University was just one example of the plight of many
religious civil servants around the country. When the courts inter-
pret the ministerial exception broadly, the judicially-created law can
serve to disassociate church employees from their civil rights. This
can affect those serving even minimally ministerial functions. The
exception, though valid in many cases, can be misconstrued in favor
of protecting sexist, racist, and bigotry-driven motives of religious
leaders. In some cases, the secular legal issue is so entangled in the
religious dogma that the court cannot be trusted to decipher it. 246
Lynette Petruska's experience represents the plight of women who
236. Id.
237. Telephone interview with Marci Hamilton, supra note 229.
238. See, e.g., Peter Schworm, Protestors Demand Priest's Apology: Accused of Aiding
Sex Abuse Cover-up, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 10, 2007, at B2; see also William Bunch & Dana
DiFilippo, But No Justice for Viwtims as Grand Jury's Powerless to Act, PHILA. DAILY NEWS,
Sept. 22, 2005, at 3.
239. Id.
240. Telephone Interview with Marci Hamilton, supra note 229.
241. Id.
242. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
243. Id. at 605.
244. Id. at 593.
245. Telephone Interview with Marci Hamilton, supra note 229.
246. Id.
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wish to become religious professionals and the lack of protection
afforded their civil liberties once they arrive there. Unfortunately,
the advancement of Petruska's cause has been halted, for the time
being, by the Supreme Court.
IV. THE MINISTERIAL ExCEPTION'S IMPACT ON WOMEN IN CLERGY
POSITIONS AND How PETRUSKA CAN HELP
The glass ceiling is just as thick, if not more so, for women like
Petruska who wish to make their careers in the church. If women are
even permitted to enter into leadership roles within a religious insti-
tution, they do so at lower numbers247 and at a slower rate than their
male counterparts. 248 A late 1990s study found that "women... con-
stitute about 10 percent of all American religious leaders. 249 Another
study found that "it takes women twice as long to reach the 50% em-
ployment mark than it does for men., 2 0 An exception to this is the
United Methodist Church, where the Church mandates that there be
a guarantee of employment for all ordained clergy.2 In general, how-
ever, men are employed far more quickly than women after graduating
from seminary.25 2 As time has gone on, the disparities between males
and females in mid-level and high-level positions within the church
have continued.25 3
It has been suggested that one reason for the discrepancy in
placement and advancement speed between men and women is that
women are being guided to lower-level service positions within their
religious institutions based on their gender.254 Beginning in seminary,
women are tracked to lower positions of clerical employment. 25 A
female entering seminary is more likely to be placed in "secular work,
interim positions, specialized ministries, chaplaincies in secular
247. Olson et al., supra note 2, at 141 ("Many American religious traditions, most
notably the Catholic Church and most of evangelical Protestantism, do not ordain women
at all.").
248. Patricia M. Y. Chang, In Search of a Pulpit: Sex Differences in the Transition from
Seminary Training to the First Parish Job, 36 J. SCI. STUDY RELIGION 614, 617 (1997)
[hereinafter In Search of a Pulpit].
249. Olson et al., supra note 2, at 140.
250. In Search of a Pulpit, supra note 248, at 617.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 618-19 (analyzing studies that found that more than fifty percent of men
versus forty percent of women found employment after ninety days, and eighty-five percent
of men have jobs within two years of graduation from seminary, compared to seventy
percent of women).
253. Paula D. Nesbitt, Clergy Feminization: Controlled Labor or Transformative
Change?, 36 J. Sci. STUDY RELIGION 585, 585 (1997).
254. Female Clergy in the Contemporary Protestant Church, supra note 4, at 566.
255. Id. at 567.
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institutions, and non-parish ministries." 256 Their superiors, a lack
of institutional support, and the difficulties associated with getting
parish positions push females into these positions.257 Females are
discouraged from becoming ordained by their religious leaders and
ordained advisors.25" Even in clergy positions, women are earning less
than their male counterparts.259 There are concerns that the presence
of women serving as professionals is superficial, as these women are
not given the opportunity for substantial authority ° Studies have
found that it takes women longer to find jobs in religious institutions
because local congregations are resistant and women are less likely
to receive aid in placement.26'
The feminization movement of religious institutions has been
slow because there is fear over community disdain for female lead-
ers.262 Religious leaders worry that women will "take over the church"
and drive away other religious workers and worshippers, that the
clergy market will be over saturated, and that rifts will occur within
churches.263 Feminine presence in the religious workplace has also
been discouraged for its alleged negative effect on male clergy.264
Simply put, women in the church, like Petruska, face inherent dis-
crimination that can at times be wrongly condoned by the government.
CONCLUSION
The future of religious employees like Petruska has been left
unprotected, or at least unexamined by the Supreme Court. If the
Court had chosen to examine the issue, there are a number of factors
that would have influenced the Supreme Court's resolution of the
issues presented by Petruska's claims. A number of the Supreme
Court Justices are of the Catholic faith.265 If nothing else, it would
256. Id. at 568.
257. Id. at 568-69.
258. Lehman, Jr., supra note 5, at 7-8.
259. Female Clergy in the Contemporary Protestant Church, supra note 4, at 568.
260. Nesbitt, supra note 253, at 585.
261. In Search of a Pulpit, supra note 248, at 615.
262. Female Clergy in the Contemporary Protestant Church, supra note 4, at 565
("Some thought that the presence of women in the pulpit would cause large numbers of
members to leave the church.").
263. Nesbitt, supra note 253, at 586.
264. Id. "Presumed adverse effects of feminization ... have included sexual temp-
tation .... male impotency .... men shirking religious responsibility .... lower male
morale, and loss of socially legitimated privilege to vestments as well as other pastoral
or sacramental activities traditionally associated with women's domestic roles."
265. Religious Affiliation of the U.S. Supreme Court, http://www.adherents.comadh
_sc.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2007).
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have been interesting to see the Court's internal battle between the
Justices' religious tendencies and their textualism. On the other hand,
recent decisions concerning the Free Exercise Clause are in contrast
to the present interpretation of the ministerial exception.26
The ministerial exception is a reminder of the freedom from
religious persecution that our forefathers fought and died for.267 The
protection of the freedom of religion relies upon the ability of churches
and other bodies of worship to practice their faith freely. History
clearly views aspects of faith and religious practice as privileged in
the eyes of the law. 8 When a religious institution seeks exclusion
from Title VII's equal opportunity mandates, the scope of § 702 and
of the ministerial exception will completely dictate the future of the
matter. If the scope of § 702 and the ministerial exception are too
broad, a religious employee may be wrongly denied her day in court.
In contrast, if the scope is read too narrowly, the line between church
and state can become blurry. Judge Becker believed in protecting
religious employees when the nature of the discrimination was neither
religious in nature nor a part of church doctrine.6 9 If the exception
is narrowly tailored, the rights of the individual, as well as the rights
of the institution, can be protected. In respecting the principle be-
hind § 702 and the ministerial exception, the courts can halt the
"free exercise of discrimination,,'2 70 and help women break through
the stained glass ceiling.
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